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Abstract 
This article is going to discuss hukou in detail and how it juxtaposes with citizenship rights of 
migrants in China. The first part of this article deals with China’s hukou policies and its implications on 
Chinese society and going to discuss how migrants are trying to fit city life even within this tight and 
strict hukou system. The second section talks about the denial of the complete citizenship to the floating 
population in their country, and how they are treated as secondary citizens by urban people. Also, article 
tries to bring the basic concept of citizenship in the light of the state policies of denial of their rights and 
discriminating its rural population even though they have been the fuel of Chinese rapid economic and 
infrastructural growth and made China as world’s factory. The third and final part examines the 
provisions of hukou and juxtaposes them with the notion of citizenship to show how they contradict each 
other in contemporary China in the era of domestic migration. So, it is a bit difficult situation to clarify 
those Chinese concepts of legitimising their views with the modern concept of citizenship. Still, it is an 
attempt to elaborate and conceptualise life and rights of migrants in Chinese cities.  
Keywords: China, Migrants, hukou, Citizenship rights 
 
1. Introduction 
China is strictly following the 
Household Registration System (Húkǒu, 户口
)** to control and prohibit the internal migration 
since state introduced the hukou system under 
the red flag of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). The hukou which was implemented in 
1958 has a significant role in determining the 
social benefits that the people of the country are 
entitled to. It has been the part of Chinese life 
for the last six decades, and it continues to 
exist,and its presence becomes more complex in 
the day to day people’s life. The hukou has 
divided the entire population in the country 
geographically and socially into two, i.e. urban 
and rural. The main objective behind the hukou 
was to prohibit the domestic migration 
especially from villages to cities. With the help 
of different institutions like village collectives 
(gōng shè，公社) and urban work units (dānwèi，
单位), the state executed such policies in a very 
effective manner, and no one can escape from its 
octopus hands till reform era started. The state’s 
welfare, privileges, and all other services were 
decided only by existing hukou. If one was born 
with urban or rural hukou, then he or she has to 
die with that same hukou status. There is no 
change of their registration.  But still, it is one of 
the main socio-economic institutions in China. 
An approximate number of migrants are more 
than 275 million distributed in different cities 
(Becker, 2014) which are noted as the largest 
peaceful migration ever in human history. From 
the traditional agricultural sector, they started 
exploring other life and employment 
opportunities in the cities. Some studies have 
begun to look at migration concerning social 
institutions such as the hukou system (e.g. Yang, 
Y. 1996; Chan, 1996; Wang and Zuo, 1997; 
Wang, 1997; Li and Siu, 1997; Solinger, 1999) 
and as well as the impact of migration on the 
economy and society and related policy issues 
(e.g. Solinger, 1995, 1999; Nolan, 1993; Wan, 
1995; Chan, 1998). For rural to urban migration 
and issues with migrants in cities one has to read 
hukou along with their citizenship rights. 
Is China abolishing its hukou policies? 
How hukou denies complete citizenship status to 
floating population? How does hukou itself 
discriminate migrants in the cities? Here in this 
article, author discusses the relationship between 
hukou and citizenship rights in the context of 
huge migrant population. Author argues that any 
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serious and meaningful research on migration in 
China must start by making reference to the 
hukou system because this affects the migration 
in different ways. And, author also argue that the 
hukou system remained a relatively powerful 
institution in structuring migration in the late 
1980s and that the same institution discriminates 
and treat its rural people like secondary citizens.  
There have been mainly two types of 
rural to urban migration which are legal and 
illegal migration. The person who migrates to 
the city by registering with both local authorities 
(rural as well as destination place) is known as a 
legal migrant. This system has started in the mid 
of 1980s onwards. But since the 80s, there was 
another type of population flows penetrated 
cities in which they never registered in any of 
the two authorities. But they kept on moving 
from one place to other as wandering beggars. 
Already people from the countryside never had 
any good privileges as urban people do, so 
moving to a city without any known person in 
the city is a bit difficult to survive for an 
ordinary village man. Here comes the universal 
citizenship or ideal citizenship of common 
people in the same country. China’s cases 
always differ from any other country in the 
world. In this situation and reign of so-called 
hukou system, the state used to divide and treat 
its people with two different ways.  
2. Hukou System and Floating Population 
The issues of floating population and 
hukou and their relationship are becoming much 
more relevant in the history of contemporary 
China especially since its reform policies which 
took place in the late 1970s. Till the 1970s from 
the foundation of PRC the Chinese society was 
not market-based and China was in the path of 
construction of socialism under their then 
Chairman Mao Zedong. China had alienated 
itself from the world, and its society was closed. 
The rate of urbanisation was very slow in nature, 
and its population was limited and regulated the 
migration from rural to urban by imposing strict 
hukou policies, and only state-led migration was 
there. A self-initiated relocation to a city from a 
village was only a dream for an ordinary 
peasant. Such a change is granted only when 
certain limited conditions are met, especially 
when the move serves the state's interests 
defined in various policies, such as state 
recruitment and transfers of personnel. Even 
today, peasants can travel to many places, but 
getting a registration to be a full-status urban 
resident in a medium-sized or large city is still 
largely beyond their reach (Chan, 2001:128-
129). 
There are two categories of migration 
since reform which is hukou migration (those 
have local hukou residency rights) and non-
hukou migration (those without hukou residency 
rights). In China, officially the hukou migration 
is only considered as migration (qiānyí, 迁移), 
anything other than this is known as population 
movement or floating (liúdòngrénkǒu, 流动人口
) (Chan, 2001). The floaters are not supposed to 
stay legally in any city permanently (temporary 
migrants). The significant amount of migration 
which China has witnessed since reform is of the 
non-hukou migration variety.  
Table 1 Hukou and non-hukou rural-urban migrants 
Characteristics Hukou migrants Non-hukou migrants 
Household registration type 
and status 
Non-agricultural and 
local 
Agricultural and non-local 
Entitlements to state-supplied 
social benefits and 
opportunities 
Full From nil to temporary 
entitlements 
Legal urban residency status Full status Illegal or temporary 
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Characteristics Hukou migrants Non-hukou migrants 
Socioeconomic sector Mostly inthestate sector Mostly in the non-state sector; 
also as temporary workers in 
state sector 
Mechanism of effecting 
migration 
Determined by 
bureaucratic decisions 
within plan limits 
Spontaneous', based on 
personal contacts and market 
information 
Stability of moves Permanent Seasonal or semi-permanent 
 
Labour characteristics of 
principal migrants Skill level 
Skilled and low-skilled 
workers 
Mostly unskilled or low-
skilled labour 
Employment type Mostly permanent jobs Temporary or semi-permanent 
jobs in non-state enterprises; 
or self-employment 
Housing Same as other urban 
residents 
Low-cost shelters or homeless 
Source:  Chan, Liu and Yang (1999:427) 
Table 1 shows the basic characteristics 
of hukou and non-hukou migrants. This table 
clearly indicates that there is a vast disparity 
between rural and urban people. Migrants (non-
hukou) treated as an outsider in the urban spaces, 
and the state has thrown them in the periphery of 
the welfare and socio-economic schemes. Even a 
foreign person can get good hospitality, but an 
individual who born and brought in China has to 
face various discrimination. The transients are 
outside of state’s benefits but in the same 
context they are the people who help to 
accelerate the urbanisation process, 
infrastructural development and are a major part 
of country’s manufacturing boom. Urban 
dwellers are entitled to subsidised grain rations 
and other goods, work allocation by labour 
bureau, subvented housing, social insurance, 
health care, and cultural and urban amenities 
provided at state expense. As such, urban 
household status has been closely linked to the 
state's rationing system of vital goods and 
services (Wong, 1994:336). Urbanites are 
politically and economically protected class 
since Mao’s era. But in the post-reform period, it 
got devolution in a certain way which led to the 
creation of new urban class of laid off labour or 
new urban poor in contemporary China. With 
the opening of markets since the late 1970s, the 
segregation began to break down, and a mass 
number of villagers made their way to the city, 
but still one way or other their segregation did 
not come to an end, they have been sidelined by 
the urbanites and the state.    
2.1. Migrants and Urban Villages  
The role played by the ‘urban villages’ 
(chéngzhōngcūn, 城中村 ) in the growth of 
China as the world’s manufacturer has been 
crucial because of the comparatively affordable 
shelters it provided for the migrant population. 
These villages act as the migrants’ entry point 
into the city. The large-scale urban expansion 
that engulfs the farmlands around leads to the 
formation of urban communities. This urban 
village phenomenon is very common in Chinese 
cities.  We can understand it as a phenomenon 
resulting from the large-scale urban expansion 
that envelopes farmlands and therefore resulting 
in an urban village. In the urban community, 
land ownership is a kind of collective 
ownership; therefore, the state is unable to make 
significant adjustments in the process of large-
scale development. Such villages have gone 
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through some constant changes and upgrades 
which could be due to market behaviour or 
could also be the government’s beautifying 
behaviour. The quality of urban villages varies. 
There are two types of villages: villages in the 
middle of the city and villages at the periphery. 
The migrant enclaves are the by-products of 
rapid urbanisation, and these villages are 
becoming the hub of migrants.  
The character of migrant enclaves varies 
from city to city and even within the villages. 
The rural migrants work as a channel to recruit 
further migrants from their villages. So they try 
to keep their cultural identity and make an 
ambience to feel like they live with their 
community people as well as in their village. 
Despite this, they also take efforts to become 
part of urban culture. But the real challenge is 
that Chinese government wants to restructure 
and beautify the city, so one day they have to 
move from those enclaves. The place already 
part of rapid urbanisation process and the area 
has much more population density than that 
accommodative which leads to many other 
social issues like increasing crime rate, hygiene 
problem, pollution and so on. However, migrant 
enclaves are under the pressure of bulldozing 
any day on upcoming days.  
 
 
2.2. Migrants’ Residence Condition in Cities  
Rural migrants can or may live in the 
city for years with the help of temporary 
household registration, but they cannot enjoy the 
same rights or privilege provided by the state as 
those having the permanent urban hukou. The 
term “temporary’ is not very easy to define here 
in this context due to various limitations on the 
duration of stay by the migrants. The temporary 
urban hukou policy specifies neither the 
maximum period of residence nor the possibility 
of conversion to permanent hukou. There are 
few ways for rural migrants to change their 
‘temporary’ residence into the permanent 
residence status (Zhang, 2011:254). So the 
permanent residence with the blessing of the 
state is not possible in a short period. Because 
the Chinese cities are already filled with much 
more than their capacity, that’s why issuing 
permanent hukou means straining resources of 
the state. Housing choice is another issue faced 
by migrants, and it is widely constrained by their 
low income and limited urban citizenship. Due 
to their employment in low paid and uncertain 
work, they cannot afford decent housing in 
cities. There is no low-income affordable 
housing sponsored by local city governments for 
urban low-income groups, especially migrants. 
So they have to opt for the least expensive 
private housing, which is generally of the 
overcrowded and poor condition.
Table 2 Housing types of temporary population in cities (%) 
Year Dormitory 
provided by 
employers 
Rental 
house 
Construction 
site 
Hotel or 
guest 
house 
Relatives 
or friends’ 
house 
Others 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
30.36 
29.30 
29.56 
29.90 
31.64 
30.28 
30.11 
27.89 
26.96 
25.15 
24.82 
27.75 
28.05 
31.06 
32.37 
35.52 
38.36 
41.05 
44.07 
45.66 
47.85 
50.14 
17.16 
15.80 
16.13 
15.70 
14.27 
13.34 
12.59 
11.72 
10.44 
10.10 
8.43 
9.44 
11.91 
9.21 
8.48 
5.91 
6.26 
4.33 
4.34 
5.23 
5.42 
4.52 
11.24 
11.00 
10.22 
9.36 
8.72 
8.08 
7.39 
7.36 
7.32 
7.19 
7.04 
4.05 
3.93 
3.82 
4.20 
3.94 
3.67 
4.53 
4.62 
4.39 
4.29 
5.03 
Source: Ministry of Public Security (various years), Wong & Rigg (eds.), 2011:255. 
Dinamika Sosial Budaya, Vol 21, No. 2, Desember 2019, pp 98-109 
p-ISSN: 1410-9859& e-ISSN: 2580-8524 
http://journals.usm.ac.id/index.php/jdsb  
 
102 
 
Table 2 shows the temporary workers, 
who are primarily composed of migrants from 
the rural areas and the housing types in cities. 
The data illustrates that the percentage of 
dormitory provided by employers decreasing 
year by year and they have to go for rental 
housing, which boosts the private rental housing 
market. Along with this, we can see an 
increasing percentage of the rental house from 
1997 to 2007. Approximately more than half of 
the temporary workers have to rely on private 
rental housing accommodation in the urban 
spaces. The percentage of migrants who stay in 
hotel or guest house’s percentage has also 
significantly reduced over the years due to high 
expenses of rent and living expenditures, and 
they must have to look for cheap housing 
options in the city. Another important factor one 
has to focus that the role of employers to provide 
accommodation to their employees is notably 
declining. This data shows that the employers do 
not want to give any benefits to employees apart 
from basic salary. Only one-fourth of the 
employers provide dormitory only to those 
working in construction and manufacturing 
sectors.  
Regarding the residential concentration 
of rural migrants, many studies have shown that 
they are often concentrated in particular migrant 
zones where social and environmental problems 
are severe. These migrant settlements stand in 
sharp contrast to wealthy districts regarding the 
living landscape and exemplify a significant 
dimension of spatial marginalisation in 
transitional urban China (Wu et al., 2014). 
2.3. Rural Labour Transfer to Urban Work 
Units Without Hukou 
With the beginning of urban economic 
reforms (the early 1990s), in which created a 
huge labour vacuum in both state enterprises and 
newly created non-state enterprises. The 
establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) 
in coastal provinces invited surplus rural labour. 
So the rural people considered this as their 
second best option (Guang and Zheng, 2005) 
apart from working in village enterprise or farm 
land. The rural population fled to cities for better 
opportunities. These temporary workers worked 
in both state and non-state workplaces without 
any other employment benefits other than salary. 
But for them, it was a new life experience and 
enjoyed their situation because their great dream 
of working in cities had come true. They have 
been part of most of the working sectors in city, 
mostly as unskilled labour. On the contrary the 
present generation, we could say the second 
generation migrants have hardly any idea about 
farming and other agricultural related works, but 
they got a better education than the former 
generation.  
 
Table 3 Rural Labour Transfer, 1995-2005 (in millions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Zhang, 2011 
Year  New recruitment of urban work-
units 
Rural labour working in urban 
work-units 
 Total From rural 
areas 
From urban 
areas 
Stock 
number 
 
 
 
As % of total 
employment of urban 
work-unit 
1995        10.61 2.42 1.67 14.31  9.6 
1996  9.85 2.1 1.42 12.65  8.5 
1997  9.42 1.93 1.29 11.53  7.7 
1998  9.28 1.78 0.97 9.13  7.4 
1999  8.25 1.71 0.89 9.23  7.7 
2000  8.11 1.83 0.97 8.97  7.7 
2001  8.34 1.94 1.03 9.04  8.1 
2002  9.33 2.49 1.29 10.02  9.1 
2003  10.34 3.1 1.52 11.43  10.4 
2004  11.18 3.6 1.85 13.18  11.9 
2005  13.23 -- -- 15.23  12 
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The table 3 presents the rural population 
transfer to the urban work units, but it does not 
show other classified groups include college 
graduates, demobilised servicemen and so on. 
The rate of migrants’ intake in the urban work 
units is increasing in the consecutive years, at 
the same time data also illustrates the declining 
rate of urbanites’ recruitment. The central issue 
in which urbanites blame the migrants is that 
they are the reason for unemployment in the 
city. But migrants mostly do the 3D (dirty, 
difficult and dangerous) works which are less 
privileged and which urbanites consider beneath 
them to do. But for some extent the induction of 
rural population into the city captured much of 
the employment space from urbanites.    
3. Rural Migrants and Citizenship Rights 
 The basic idea of citizenship has always 
been associated with the nation-state. Bryan S 
Turner says that citizenship has two critical 
components, and it is possessed by those who 
have authoritatively been determined: a) to 
belong to the community and b) to have rights to 
share in the public distribution of its goods. In 
other definition, it is all about rights and 
privileges of individuals, who are legally living 
within specifically designated border which 
means in any country (Solinger, 1999). But here 
in the Chinese case, something is very different 
from these concepts. According to the concept 
of citizenship, everyone belongs to a particular 
nation and should be treated equally, in China 
people has divided into two by hukou and 
country people is spread over the cities. Still, 
there is an invisible division among the people. 
Those transients are not treated equally by 
urbanites and the state. They lack rights and 
privileges which provided to their counterpart 
citizens having urban hukou. Apart from 
showing this structural discrimination since the 
establishment of PRC, urbanites consider them 
as second class citizens. They are certainly not 
citizens there due to lack of urban hukou 
(primarily non-agricultural hukou). Because of 
this deprivation, it is clear that peasant migrants 
have official ineligibility for any medical, 
educational, housing, welfare or services of any 
sort in the cities. So migrants have to adjust and 
coexist with urbanites without any privilege or 
necessary right from the state.  
3.1. Social Exclusion of migrants in Cities 
The people from the countryside are 
excluded in many ways in China’s transitional 
cities, mainly due to their ineligibility to access 
public goods and services. There is no chance to 
get permanent hukou status; so they have to face 
many challenges in their day to day life. 
3.1.1. Residence Right 
The residence rights of migrants are 
similar to foreign nationals living as ‘guest 
workers’. They do have any right to buy 
property, to bring their spouses or children with 
them, or even any to residency (Chan, 1998). 
Solinger (1999) says that regulations forbade 
outsiders not just from building or buying 
houses (unless one was an Overseas Chinese), 
but even from occupying the land.
Table 4 Housing tenure for rural, urban, and migrant households, 2002 and 2007 (% of households) 
 2002 2007 
Rural Urban Migrant Rural Urban Migrant 
Renters 0.8 18.2 58.1 n.a 9.8 74.5 
Owners 98.8 78.8 7.2 n.a 88.7 3.9 
Reform housing  60.7   54.9  
commodity housing  7.4   27  
inherited, self-built, 
and other 
 9.7   6.8  
Other/missing 0.3 4 34.7 n.a 1.5 21.6 
Note: Shi and Sicular et al. (2013) 
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Migrants have to meet the social 
discrimination by the local residents in the 
region in which they are employed. The urban 
housing policy has changed many times since 
the 1980s. Now people have property rights, but 
they can own property only in particular hukou 
places, which means, a person has an urban 
hukou cannot own property in the rural area and 
vice versa. However, with the help of this 
policy, urbanites entered into the real estate and 
housing markets. But migrants have to either 
rent a house or stay as paying guest with no 
prospect of holding any property in non-hukou 
regions. There are another group of villagers 
who have less fortune, jobless and could not 
afford a certain form of shelter, or lacked the 
money to rent a room or bed. During the 
nineties, their numbers had multiplied in the 
cities. They found a place for a stay in hidden 
back streets, under trucks and buses, in the 
parking lot, in tunnels, in the waiting areas of 
railway stations, and under bridges (Solinger, 
1999).  
Some report says that on shacks of just 
300 square meters in Beijing holding more than 
500 people or offering just one toilet for over 
6000 people. The shelter to this marginal group 
needed to be made with the rudest of adaptations 
of scrap metal, cardboard, and wood. The 
population fled from the countryside is 
attributed as one of the main reasons for the 
boom in the urban real estate regime. It is very 
much visible that migrants stay in suburb areas, 
and particularly people from the same village or 
province remain in some particular locality 
(migrant village or peasant enclave). The 
sojourning peasants have almost no urban home 
ownership; housing surveys carried out in 
Beijing and Shanghai shows this fact, which 
finds that the ownership of housing is lower than 
one percentage among migrants (Wu, 2002).    
Table 4 presents the varieties 
households of three distinct groups of population 
in two different years (2002 and 2007), in which 
the household ownership rate of transient 
peasants have significantly reduced from 2002 
to 2007 from 7.2 percentages to 3.9 percentages 
which substantiate the migrants’ incapability or 
ineligibility to own houses in the city. The 
percentage of renting household is dramatically 
increased from 58.1 percentages to 74.5 
percentages which show almost all migrants 
have to depend on the private renting residence. 
We have to have a very clear understanding here 
that the state policies repeatedly shows 
discrimination and partiality one side to migrant 
labour and on the other side urbanites taking 
advantages of new urban housing policies as 
well as private property constructions and 
earning the pretty good amount of money from 
renting it to outsiders. 
3.1.2. Health Care System 
In a country like China, state funding for 
public health facilities, medication were planned 
based on the official urban population per city, 
so local bureaucrats are troubled to arrange such 
facilities of health care for newcomers from the 
villages. Even as responsible authorities decried 
the implications for the settled population of 
ignoring the epidemics and contagious diseases 
carried in by the migrants, they were too starved 
of resources to do anything much about it 
(Solinger, 1999). In this case, floaters have to 
look for some other health care options. But 
there were medical centres established and 
maintained by migrants those who were living in 
different migrant enclaves (example migrant 
enclaves like Zhejiang village in Beijing). Here 
Zhejiang people in Beijing had created their 
clinics and hospitals by the mid of the 1990s, 
where treatment provided by fellow 
Zhejiangese, who are holding medical licenses 
from home. However, medical consultation and 
treatment are very expensive in cities which are 
unbearable to migrant workers, but they have to 
adjust with and live accordingly. Due to high 
population density and hygiene issues in the 
migrants’ living space, there are always chances 
for the epidemics to spread, which creates their 
life more vulnerable.  
3.1.3. Educational Rights  
Like any other facilities, the transients 
are not entitled to the state basic education 
policy. The China’s “Law on Compulsory 
Education” states that all children aged seven to 
fifteen must enrol and receive compulsory 
education for nine years. Due to the excess 
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population of cities including floaters, the 
schooling availability becomes uneven. Similar 
to the health care system, education is also 
officially under the jurisdiction of the local 
government. So their funds are limited to 
educate the children of urban residents (urban 
hukou). There is no national policy or any 
regulations on educating the offspring of the 
floating population. The Central government has 
provided no funding for migrants. However, a 
few local bodies had set up unstable, 
unaccredited make-shift schools to migrants’ 
children. There was a statement of Beijing 
Municipal Bureau Education regarding this issue 
in 1996, 
Beijing is very short on money for 
education. Looking after the present million 
middle and primary school students in the 
city already strains resources, and there 
are 300,000 school-age children among the 
migrant population. Middle and primary 
schools in the city have already taken in 
more than 30,000 migrant children. Though 
the parents of some have paid, the amount 
of money paid is far from enough to 
educate these students… formerly these 
(children) were the responsibility of the 
receiving area, but nowadays Beijing can’t 
possibly solve the education problems of 
300,000 migrant children. 
Normally nowadays the expenditure on 
education is very high in the cities, without an 
urban hukou migrants’ children are ineligible for 
free compulsory education. At the same time, 
they can’t afford the city educational expense. 
Indeed, they send their children back home 
(village), and they get education and stay with 
their grandparents. Although, we can find some 
primary educational institutions like nursery run 
by migrants in certain migrant enclaves and tutor 
would be the rural graduate fellow (migrant 
enclaves in Beijing and Guangdong). Denying 
education is another necessary right they needed 
to claim it from the state.  
3.1.4. Rights to Social Security 
With exclusive nature and 
marginalisation character migrants stay in the 
periphery of social security schemes too. The 
sojourners do not have any entitlement to either 
social security policies of the state or private 
employers. So they have to take necessary social 
security policies. The figure 1.1 shows that 
significant numbers of migrant workers do not 
get any of the social insurance coverage like 
pension, medical insurance, unemployment 
insurance, work-related injury insurance, and 
maternity insurance. 
 
Figure 1 Percentage of long-distance rural migrant workers with social insurance coverage (2010-2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: China Labour Bulletin Report, 2015 
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Most of the migrant labourers are 
interested in taking work-related injury 
insurance which gives an idea that how danger 
or risky work they involve themselves in. In 
many cases, they do work in most unsafe 
conditions without any safety measures. 
However, less than thirty percentages of migrant 
workers have gone for such insurance coverage 
scheme during 2010 to 2014. A very low 
percentage of workers are only interested in 
unemployment insurance and medical insurance 
schemes. Because of low income and high city 
living expense and not being insured by the 
employer they hardly have money to go for 
social insurance coverage to protect their life 
from many dangerous working environments. 
The number of the maternity insurance coverage 
shows the female and married women also 
actively participate in the urban labour market. 
Rising work accidental causalities are increasing 
day by day in different cities of China where 
they do protest in the street for their 
compensation.  
4. Is China Abolishing Hukou System? 
Is China planning to abolish its more 
than six decades hukou system which divided 
Chinese society into two? This topic has been 
the point of discussion and debate in China in 
past few years. The so-called “cities with 
invisible walls,” the hukou excluded and 
marginalised the sojourning peasants in the 
cities, which provided all the privileges and 
rights to urbanites and none to rural migrants. 
The system always keeps villagers out of many 
urban jobs, except for those considered less 
privileged works for city dwellers. These less 
privileged urban works are also dirty, dangerous 
and low paid. China’s urbanisation policies 
which are known as “incomplete urbanisation,” 
(Chan and Buckingham, 2008) as practised since 
reforms, allows peasants entry to the city but 
always kept them away from permanent 
residency rights and many other social benefits. 
The hukou system is a foundation of China’s 
infamous rural-urban “apartheid,” creating an 
artificial division in the urban space. It is a key 
element of inequality and injustice, perhaps the 
fundamental part of China’s social and spatial 
stratification. We would say hukou is against the 
basic rights of peasants who stay in cities, which 
shows the main reason for their human rights 
violations. In one side hukou got relaxed and 
reformed in certain ways so that rural people can 
freely flow to the cities. But on the other hand 
they do suffer in the cities due to lack of social 
welfare benefits provided by state.  
 Many newspaper reports published in 
late 2005 understood the most recent round of 
reform initiatives to suggest that the hukou is set 
to be abolished, and the rural residents will soon 
be “granted urban rights.” The last round of 
news on the upcoming abolish of the hukou 
appeared after Chinese domestic media carried a 
report by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) 
on eliminating the division between agricultural 
and non-agricultural hukou at a meeting 
convened by a central committee on public order 
in late October 2005 (Chan & Buckingham, 
2008:584). 
Table 5 Number of nongzhuanfei migrants 
(1000) 
Year 
Number of nongzhuanfei 
migrants 
1991 656 
1992 1358 
1993 1265 
1994 1259 
1995 1388 
1996 1202 
1997 1326 
1998 929 
1999 870 
2000 1003 
Source: Guang, 2005:177 
The Official English newspaper China Daily 
reported this news under the title “Rural 
dwellers to granted urban rights,” and hailed the 
move as a “landmark initiate to abolish the 
discrimination in the name of hukou in eleven 
provinces (Chan and Buckingham, 2008). So 
many international media printed the chorus of 
the same story. If it so, there are nearly 300 
million rural migrants can also get the state 
provided benefits.  
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Chan claims that the abolition of the 
hukou would come if there is a fundamental shift 
in rural-urban relations, and it is evident that 
there has been no such change in the past few 
years. Fei Ling Wang’s findings of the hukou 
system also says that “this powerful and 
omnipresent, albeit adapted and adjusted, the 
system is alive and well” (Wang, 2004:129). 
After the November report by the MPS, there 
was no hope or substantive change in peasant 
migrants’ struggle for equality and the rights to 
the city till now. In contrary to the MPS report 
on hukou reforms, was an announcement by 
Shenzhen government body that called for 
tightening of admission of migrants’ children to 
local public schools. China’ abolishing of hukou 
would be a major revolution on China’s path to a 
modern open and equal social order. China did 
some experiments with hukou reforms like by 
introducing nongzhuangfei (农转非 ) reform 
which means the process of converting hukou 
from agricultural to non-agricultural. The hukou 
migration only officially considered as qianyi 
(migration) in China, any other mode of internal 
migration is merely known as liudongrenkou 
(population movement or floaters). In the late 
1990s, any rural to urban migration involving 
permanent hukou change required both the 
nongzhuangfei process and a geographical 
change in residential place. During the 1970s 
and 80s nongzhuangfei only issues on those 
recruited as permanent employees by a state-
owned enterprise, those enrolled in an institution 
of higher education, those displaced due to state-
initiated land expropriation, those who joined 
the army, etc. In a simple word, it was a kind of 
state-led migration. For each locality, the annual 
quota of nongzhuangfei was controlled by the 
central government at 0.15 to 0.2 percent of the 
non-agricultural population (Chan and 
Buckingham, 2008:591). 
 Table 5 shows a statistical 
representation of nongzhuangfei during 1990 to 
2000. The data gives an idea of increasing 
number of hukou conversion during that decade. 
Thousands of people converted their hukou 
status, and those who converted hukou was for 
the employment in the state-owned enterprises. 
The height hukou conversion happened in 
between 1992-1997, which shows the increasing 
number of hukou migration from rural areas. 
The different scholarly articles, studies, 
and reports say that there was a discussion on 
abolishing of hukou by the Chinese government, 
but as of now, they do not want to take it into 
serious policy implementation. It will be tough 
to protect millions of migrants under the 
government’s welfare scheme. Any sudden 
change in hukou policy would might have 
adverse implications for the entire state 
machinery. So, China is not going to abolish 
hukou very soon, but the state tries to come up 
with some mechanism to reduce the present 
tension of the rural migrants.   
5. Conclusion 
In China, it is absorbing and important 
to study the relationship between the hukou and 
citizenship rights associated with the migrants in 
the cities. One side, hukou acts as the state 
machinery to channelize the state provided 
social benefits to the urban dwellers, and another 
side, it restricts and controls the population 
move from the countryside to cities. The hukou 
is a fundamental tool which determines the 
rights and privileges and provided the state 
protection to the urban people and at the same 
time, it denies the same rights to the transient 
peasants. The hukou is the major factor which 
segregates rural migrants from urbanites. Here, 
it is clear that the hypothesis hukou policies have 
denied the citizenship rights of the migrant 
population in Chinese cities is concluded as true 
and apt in the present circumstances in China. 
Migrants can only claim full citizenship if there 
is an abolition of hukou system. Otherwise, they 
would be treated as second class citizens and 
continues the injustice and unrest among them, 
and it will lead to protest and fight for social 
justice. It is impossible to the state to 
immediately abolish an institution like hukou 
because it creates imbalance in the entire system 
of governance and challenges the state’s 
authority on people. But at the time, the 
communist state has to come up with some 
certain remedies to reduce the tension between 
state and the migrants by making new policies 
which address the basic issues of the migrants. 
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Otherwise, it will lead to affect the stability of 
the state’s political and economic conditions. 
Notes:  
*Sumesh Manganelly, currently working as PhD 
Research scholar under the Department of 
Politics at the East China Normal University in 
Shanghai, China. He has completed his Master 
of Philosophy (M Phil) program from the Centre 
for East Asian Studies, School of International 
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University in New 
Delhi, India in 2016. He has obtained his Master 
Degree from the Department of Politics and 
International Studies, Pondicherry University in 
Puducherry, India in 2014. He completed his 
Graduation in BSc Statistics from Kannur 
University in Kerala, India in 2011. His research 
interest includes the migrant workers, society, 
political system and international relations of 
China, Marxism and Ambedkar’s writings.  
**Hukou is referred as house hold registration 
system in China which established in 1958 and it 
determines the one’s belonging to the locality. 
Chinese population has been divided into two 
under the hukou dual classification which are 
agricultural and non-agricultural population stay 
in rural and urban respectively.   
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